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DISCUSSION OF RECENT DECISIONS
ATTORNEY AND CLIENT-THE OFFICE OF ATTORNEY-WHETHER CON-
CEALMENT AT TIME OF SEEKING ADMISSION TO THE BAR OF A PRIOR CON-
VICTION FOR CRIME JUSTIFIES DISBARMENT OF THE ATTORNEY-The Supreme
Court of New Jersey, in the recent case of In re Hyra,1 was faced with the
problem of determining the proper punishment to be imposed on an at-
115 N. J. 252, 104 A. (2d) 609 (1954). Vanderbilt, C. J., wrote a dissenting
opinion, concurred in by Heher and Wachenfeld, JJ., favoring disbarment of the
respondent.
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torney who, at the time of seeking admission to a bar examination and to
the bar, had failed to reveal to a character and fitness committee the fact
that he previously had been convicted on five charges of burglary and
larceny, the sentences for which had been suspended. He also, apparently,
had failed to disclose the existence of these past convictions to those who
wrote character references for him. When the fact of the respondent's
prior criminal record was brought to the attention of the court, disbarment
proceedings were instituted and the local character and fitness committee
held a hearing. At this time the respondent, interrogated as to his reason
for answering negatively under oath to a direct question as to whether or
not he had ever been concerned as a party in any legal proceeding, stated
that, at the time he answered, he was then fearful that a truthful dis-
closure would have prevented him from taking the necessary examina-
tion. The matter then came before the court, which held, under a f our-to-
three decision, that certain mitigating circumstances 2 justified a judgment
that the respondent should be no more than suspended from practice for
a period of two years but the majority did serve warning that future
applicants who transgressed in a like manner could expect nothing short
of disbarment.
Good moral character being regarded as a universal requirement for
all who would aspire to become members of the legal profession, it is com-
mon to expect applicants to establish the presence thereof before being
admitted as well as to sustain the same in order to retain membership in
the bar.3 Not only is the requirement a universal one but it is regarded
as being paramount in importance, whereby even learning and diligence
become matters of secondary consideration. This has long been true in
New Jersey, where a court rule specifies that "no person [shall] be ad-
mitted to such examination [to practice as an attorney at law] unless he
shall be of good moral character, "4 and is also the case in other jurisdic-
tions. 5 To the end that only persons of unimpeachable character are ad-
mitted, most jurisdictions have established committees charged with the
duty to investigate the background of all applicants,6 or have provided
2 In addition to a period of military service prior to engaging in the study of law,
respondent had, after admission to practice, been appointed as municipal court
clerk in his community. In each of these instances, he had made disclosure of his
prior record. The court did note that, so far as was known, the respondent's
professional relations with clients had been "without blemish."
3 See 7 C. J. S., Attorney and Client, § 7b, p. 712; 5 Am. Jur., Attorneys at Law,
§ 23, p. 275.
4 This rule, adopted in revised form in 1805, appears in I N. J. L., vi, Rule 3.
5 See, for example, Rule 58 of the Illinois Supreme Court, Ill. Rev. Stat. 1953,
Vol. 2, Ch. 110, § 259.58(1), where the general qualification of "a good moral char-
acter" is included with other more specific requirements.
6 Such is the case in New Jersey: R. R. 1:20-6. See also Ill. Rev. Stat. 1953,
Vol. 2, Ch. 110, § 259.58 (IX).
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other machinery for the purpose,7 and the applicant is usually required,
under oath, to answer questions propounded to him bearing on the point.s
As it would also be accepted that a primary requisite for a good moral
character would be a reverence for the truth, the strong weight of au-
thority in those jurisdictions which have been faced with the instant
problem has been to the effect that a concealment on the part of an
applicant for admission to the bar of facts showing a prior conviction for
crime would be a fraud on the admitting court, justifying the subsequent
revocation of any license obtained by means thereof." So deep-seated is
this view that it has been said that an applicant's concealment of the fact
that he had merely been charged or indicted for crime, even though never
convicted, would be sufficient ground for the revocation of the license.'0
Since the majority opinion in the instant case stresses the point that there
generally is no place in the law for an individual who will not tell the
truth, even when his own interests are involved, the decision rendered ap-
pears to be lacking in support" as well as in reason.
While a lapse from grace on the part of one regularly admitted may
not require the imposition of the severest penalty known to the profession,
the same thing could hardly be said to be true of one whose entrance into
7 A judicial certificate on the point from a court of record was, at one time,
required in Illinois: Smith-Hurd Ill. Rev. Stat. 1931, Ch. 13, § 2.
8 The court concerned with the instant case suggested, parenthetically, that a
direct question as to whether or not the applicant had ever been convicted of crime
could well be asked hereafter. The Illinois questionnaire requires the applicant not
only to state whether he has been a "party or otherwise involved in any action or
legal proceeding, either civil or criminal or quasi-criminal" but also requires a
positive answer to the question as to whether or not the applicant has ever been
"charged with crime, or arrested." A positive answer to either question requires
the applicant to give "names of cases, courts where heard, and dates of all court
proceedings" with the results thereof. A pending proposal to require the filing of a
set of fingerprints by each applicant, already operative in certain states, represents
an extension of this Idea.
9 The cases favoring disbarment for such concealment are collected in an annota-
tion to the case of Schireson v. Shafer, 354 Pa. 458, 47 A. (2d) 665 (1946), appearing
in 165 A. L. R. 1133, at p. 1149. Statutes also exist on the point: 5 Am. Jur.,
Attorneys at Law, § 259, p. 416.
loIn Spears v. State Bar of California, 211 Cal. 183, 294 P. 697 (1930), the court
said a duty rests on the applicant to make a full disclosure to the investigating
committee as to criminal charges preferred against him, regardless of their out-
come, which duty is absolute and breach of which would not be excused by advice
to the contrary.
11 The dissenting opinion in the instant case noted that, in the matter entitled
On Application for Attorney's License, 21 N. J. L. 345 (1848), Chief Justice Green
said: "If it appear by the record of conviction that an applicant had been convicted
of larceny, the court would not admit him . . . They would immediately upon proof
of such fact strike his name from the roll after his admission . .. The act charged
involves fraud and moral turpitude. It is precisely such a charge, and rests upon
such evidence as would, if committed in the course of practice, warrant the court
In calling upon an attorney to show cause why his name should not be stricken
from the roll."
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the bar had been obtained by fraud for disbarment would then be the only
adequate remedy by which to revoke the license thus improperly obtained.
This distinction was made in the New York ease of In re Klein,12 has been
followed in later cases arising in that state,18 and was invoked in the Cali-
fornia case of In re Holland14 where the respondent had actually received
a pardon for his earlier criminal offenses but had failed to reveal the facts
at the time of applying for admission to the state bar. The only known
exception, other than the one provided by the instant case, appears to have
been developed in the case entitled Re Jung5 where the court did not
favor disbarment because it felt that the respondent had not been guilty
of wilfully and knowingly concealing any material fact in his application.
It is strange, therefore, to find a court decreeing no more than a tem-
porary suspension of the license to a person who had fraudulently obtained
admission to the bar. By so doing, the court is, in effect, palliating the
fraud so practiced for, after a short period of suspension, the licensee will
be entitled to regain full status in the profession on a par with those
who rightfully gained the privilege of serving the public as ministers of
justice. The high moral code which the legal profession has espoused' 6
would have been better served had the court decided, unanimously, for
disbarment.
R. A. VON KAENEL
FALSE PRETENSES-PERSONs LIABLE-WHETHER A PARTNER CAN BE
GUILTY OF THE CRIME OF OBTAINING MONEY BY FALSE PRETENSE WHEN
THE MONEY OBTAINED IS THE PROPERTY OF THE PARTNERSHIP-In the re-
cent case of State v. Quinn,' the Supreme Court of Iowa was faced with
the problem of determining whether a partner, indicted for allegedly ob-
12 242 App. Div. 494, 275 N. Y. S. 703 (1934).
13 See In re Braunstone, 265 App. Div. 337, 38 N. Y. S. (2d) 593 (1942), reargu-
ment and leave to appeal denied, 265 App. Div. 1040, 39 N. Y. S. (2d) 1004 (1943),
and In re Baldwin, 258 App. Div. 661, 17 N. Y. S. (2d) 727 (1940).
14 96 Cal. App. 655, 274 P. 559 (1929). See also State Bar of California v. Hull,
103 Cal. App. 302, 284 P. 492 (1930), where the same principle was applied to one
seeking admission on the basis of a foreign license.
15 13 Cal. (2d) 199, 88 P. (2d) 679 (1939).
16 Not only is the judge expected to criticize and correct unprofessional attitudes
on the part of members of the bar, pursuant to Canon 11 of the Canons of Judicial
Ethics, but the lawyers themselves are admonished, by Canon 29 of the Canons of
Professional Ethics of the American Bar Association, to "expose without fear or
favor ... corrupt or dishonest conduct" by lawyers and to "aid in guarding the Bar
against the admission to the profession of candidates unfit or unqualified because
deficient in either moral character or education."
1- Iowa -, 64 N. W. (2d) 323 (1954). Oliver, J., and Smith, J., each wrote a
concurring opinion. Thompson, J., wrote a dissenting opinion concurred in by Bliss,
Ch. 3., and Garfield, J.
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taining money under false pretenses, could be held guilty of such a crime
where the money involved was part of the partnership funds. 2  The case
arose on an indictment which charged that the defendant and his then
partner were engaged in the used-car business, operated by the partner-
ship; that the defendant had purchased a car, for resale by the partner-
ship, with his own funds; but, with intent to defraud his partner, had
falsely represented that he had paid more for the same than was the fact;
that he thereby induced his partner to draw a check, in favor of the de-
fendant, on partnership funds for the amount falsely represented as the
purchase price, and, in this fashion, obtained a sum of money by false
pretenses. The trial court directed a verdict of acquittal and the prosecu-
tion appealed. The state supreme court affirmed the trial court holding
when a majority of the justices thereof agreed that a partner could not be
guilty of the named offense if the money obtained already belonged to the
partnership.
It being well-settled law that the crime of obtaining money by false
pretenses requires the transfer of title as well as possession,3 the prose-
cution contended that a transfer of funds from the partnership to the de-
fendant as an individual was sufficient to complete this requirement.
Lacking direct local precedent on the point, the majority drew an analogy
from the Iowa case of Gary v. Northwestern Masonic Aid Association,4
growing out of an alleged embezzlement of partnership funds by a partner,
to reach the conclusion that this could not be so since, in law, partners
"are treated, in a qualified sense, as joint tenants of the partnership prop-
erty, having an interest therein per my et per tout.'' 5 It further refused to
accept an argument that, there being a difference in the statutory language
defining the offense of obtaining money by false pretense from that which
defines the crimes of larceny and embezzlement,8 it was not necessary that
the defendant obtain the "property of another" but merely obtain the
money "from another. ' ' 7 As the three offenses were said to differ only
in the means by which the taking and conversion was to be accomplished,
2 The prosecution was based on Iowa Code 1950, § 713.1.
8 State v. Reysa, 198 Iowa 496, 199 N. W. 1000 (1924) ; People v. Cory, 124 Misc.
532, 208 N. Y. S. 768 (1925). See also 35 C. .. S., False Pretenses, § 24.
4 87 Iowa 25, 53 N. W. 1086 (1893).
5 87 Iowa 25 at 32, 53 N. W. 1086 at 1088.
6 Contrast Iowa Code 1950, § 713.1, with § 709.1, dealing with larceny, and § 710,
dealing with embezzlement. A similar distinction might be noted in Ill. Rev. Stat.
1953, Vol. 1, Ch. 38, § 253, concerning false pretenses, and Ch. 38, § 387, dealing with
larceny.
7 In State v. Clark, 141 Iowa 297, 119 N. W. 719 (1909), the court said the
difference in language was not material since the offense charged could only be
committed by obtaining "money, goods, or property belonging to another."
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the majority concluded that a partner could neither steal,8 embezzle,9 nor
criminally cheat in partnership matters,10 although he might do so with
respect to third persons, 1 including those who contemplated the formation
of a partnership but who had not yet actually entered into one.1
2
The case is the more remarkable not so much for the fact that it rep-
resents one of the few holding on the point of law concerned 1 3 as for the
outspoken, even denunciatory, criticism voiced by the dissenting judges.
Aside from expressing the belief that the final outcome of the case repre-
sented a "manifest failure of justice" and a "reproach to the law and to
the courts which administer it," because too much emphasis was placed
on form rather than substance, the dissenting opinion took the position
that the theory of joint ownership of partnership funds, admitted to have
a place in civil matters, was no more than a "legal fiction" which should
not be pursued to the point of making it a cloak for gross cheats and
frauds. Noting the fact that, in Iowa, a partnership is now considered
as a separate entity, distinct from the partners who compose it, 1 4 the
minority deduced the principle that a taking of funds from a partnership
by a partner should be no different than a taking of funds belonging to a
corporation by one of its servants or employees.15 In this respect, the dis-
sent does no more than elevate one fiction over another with little to choose
between them except for the fact that the legal entity fiction is the more
recent of the two views as to the nature of a partnership.
One other point is made by the dissent, and it does merit attention.
While, as between partners, no law action can be maintained with respect
to partnership transactions until there has been an accounting and a set-
tlement of the partnership affairs,16 there is no doubt that each partner
8 Phelps v. State, 109 Ga. 115, 34 S. E. 210 (1899) ; State v. Eberhart, 106 Wash.
222, 179 P. 853 (1919).
9 State v. Sanders, 23 Ariz. 20, 201 P. 93, 17 A. L. R. 980 (1921) ; Pierce v.
Commonwealth, 210 Ky. 465, 276 S. W. 135 (1925) ; State v. Reddick, 2 S. D. 124,
48 N. W. 846 (1891) ; Napoleon v. State, 3 Tex. Crim. App. 522 (1877).
10 22 Am. Jur., False Pretenses, § 33. See also State v. Brown, 38 Mont. 309,
99 P. 954 (1909), but note that the evidence there failed to disclose the existence of
a partnership, and State v. Mendenhall, 24 Wash. 12, 63 P. 1109 (1901).
11 People v. Cravens, 79 Cal. App. (2d) 658, 180 P. (2d) 453 (1947).
.12 Commonwealth v. Brown, 167 Mass. 144, 45 N. E. 1 (1896).
13 See also Reg. v. Evans, 9 Cox Crim. Cas. 239 (1862). Pollock, C. B., there
noted that the effect of a partner's misrepresentation, whereby he had been able to
obtain funds from the partnership, would be "overhauled when the accounts were
gone into," but could not be made the basis of a criminal prosecution.
14 Jensen v. Wiersma, 185 Iowa 551, 170 N. W. 780, 4 A. L. R. 298 (1919). The
contrary view is illustrated by Abbott v. Anderson, 265 Ill. 285, 106 N. E. 782 (1914),
and Hormer v. Bennett, 241 Ill. App. 134 (1926).
15 There is dicta to that effect in State v. Pierson, 204 Iowa 837, 216 N. W. 43
(19,27).
16 Malott v. Seymour, 101 Cal. App. (2d) 245, 225 P. (2d) 310 (1950) ; Johanik v.
Des Moines Drug Co., 235 Iowa 679, 17 N. W. (2d) 385 (1945).
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has at least an equitable right in the partnership assets and a right to
secure equitable aid for the protection thereof against the unauthorized
or unwarranted acts of his fellow partner without the need to seek dis-
solution of the partnership or a winding up of its affairs. 17  Granted that
the partner's actual distributive share in the partnership assets may be
dependent on the existence of a residue after the discharge of all partner-
ship liabilities,' 8 it would still be possible to trace the ultimate interest of
the partner in these assets. It is this interest which the one partner, as in
the instant case, would acquire from the other by fraud, so, except for its
equitable character, 19 it could well be considered as the "property of an-
other" within the meaning of statutes relating to the obtaining of prop-
erty by false pretense. If this is too strained a view to take with regard to
the interpretation of a criminal statute, which statutes are notoriously
open to no more than a strict construction,20 there would seem to be ade-
quate reason for legislative reconsideration on the point to the end that
the law may continue to command the respect of all as an instrument for
justice.
H. L. BACCUS
INSURANCE----RIGHT TO PROCEEDS--WHETHIER A SUBSEQUENT SUPPLF-
MENTAIlY CONTRACT TO A MATURED LIFE INSURANCE POLICY PROVIDING
CONDITIONALLY FOR DISTRIBUTION O PROCEEDS AFTER DEATH IS TESTA-
MENTARlY IN CHARACTER--A decision of more than passing interest, both
to insurance companies and the insuring public, appears to have been
achieved by the final outcome of the New York case of Hall v. Mutual Life
Insurance Company of New York.' According to that case, an insured had
obtained an ordinary life policy and had designated his daughter as bene-
ficiary thereof. Upon the death of the insured, the daughter, with some
slight modification,2 exercised one of the settlement options provided for in
17 Morrison v. Austin State Bank, 213 Ill. 472, 72 N. E. 1109, 104 Am. St. Rep. 225
(1904).
is Richardson v. Adler, 46 Ark. 43 (1885).
19 It has, for example, been held sufficient to support a prosecution for obtaining
property by false pretense to show that the defendant obtained the release of a
mortgage which, because not properly recorded, amounted to no more than an
equitable lien: Judkins v. State, 123 Ark. 28, 184 S. W. 407 (1916).
20 People v. Lund, 382 Ill. 213, 46 N. E. (2d) 929 (1943).
1306 N. Y. 909, 119 N. E. (2d) 598 (1954), affirming 282 App. Div. 203, 122
N. Y. S. (2d) 239 (1953), which reversed 201 Misc. 203, 109 N. Y. S. (2d) 646
(1952). The New York Court of Appeals handed down only a brief unanimous
per curim memorandum. Cohn, J., wrote a dissenting opinion to the holding of
the Appellate Division.
2 The supplementary contract called for quarter-annual, rather than annual, pay-
ment of interest on the policy proceeds left on deposit, and also contained a
reservation of the right to make partial or total withdrawal of the funds by the
policy beneficiary at any time.
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the policy, electing to leave the proceeds with the company subject to her
call but irrevocably designating the person who was her then husband to re-
ceive any unpaid balance upon the death of the daughter-beneficiary, with
a contingent provision for payment to the daughter's legal representa-
tives in case her then husband did not survive her. This exercise of the
optional features of the life insurance policy was evidenced by a separate
writing designated as a supplementary contract which, while it took the
form of a life insurance policy, was actually not one. 3 Thereafter, the
daughter-beneficiary secured a divorce from her then husband, married
another, and died a few months later without having withdrawn any of
the insurance fund or making any change in the existing arrangement.
The first husband, as plaintiff, claimed payment under the supplementary
contract and the company, when sued, impleaded the legal representatives
of the daughter-beneficiary. The latter asserted the arrangement was void
as an attempted testamentary disposition which failed to comply with local
provisions regarding wills. 4  On that contention, the trial judge, acting
on a motion for summary judgment, awarded the fund to the daughter's
estate. The Appellate Division, dividing two to one, reversed this holding
and directed that summary judgment should be entered in favor of the
plaintiff. The New York Court of Appeals, following further appeal to
it, reached the same result when it appears to have considered the supple-
mentary arrangement for payment under the original policy to have been
one of contractual, rather than one of testamentary, character.
The decision so achieved is one of profound importance when con-
sideration is given to the fact that literally millions of life insurance and
similar contracts are presently in force in the United States most of which,
certainly those issued since 1906 when the first New York statute authoriz-
ing optional forms of settlement was enacted, 5 contain varied forms of
optional provisions for payment of the policy proceeds at the election of
the beneficiaries named therein. It is clear, then, that a contrary decision
could well have had a catastrophic effect, not only as to existing settle-
ment arrangements under which millions of dollars are being paid out an-
nually to beneficiaries who have preferred not to take lump sum payments
but also with respect to potential arrangements formulated by policy
holders who frequently value these optional provisions almost as highly
as they value the protection afforded by insurance itself. The unanimous
3 It is clear that the daughter did not take payment under the original policy and
then use the money to buy a single-premium policy on her own life. She merely, in
effect, gave direction as to the handling of money which was then due and payable
to her.
4 See Thompson, Cons. Laws N. Y., Decedent Estate Law, § 21, which sets forth
the formalities to be observed in the making of a will.
5 N. Y. Laws 1906, Ch. 326, § 101.
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character of the holding by the highest court in one of the nation's larger
insurance centers should go a long way toward settling those doubts which
have, heretofore, been expressed. 6 A true appreciation of the holding,
however, can best be obtained after consideration of the several factors
urged, both pro and con, on this momentous issue.
The executors concerned had urged, in the trial court, that the supple-
mentary contract was analogous to a situation wherein one who had de-
posited money in a bank to draw interest had further directed that the
fund should be paid to another upon the death of the depositor, other than
by way of a joint tenancy arrangement,7 thereby attempting to make a
testamentary disposition of the proceeds. 8 The trial court, impressed with
this argument, based more upon principles of property law rather than
those of contract, refused to treat with the question as being one simply
of insurance or, for that matter, as a valid social, economic and estab-
lished institutional arrangement, but rather viewed the trivial variations
made in the original policy as an indication that the original contract had
been fully executed by both the parties and a new arrangement had been
formulated between them,9 which new arrangement fell into the class of
invalid testamentary dispositions of property despite the statute providing
for optional modes of settlement on life insurance policies. The Appellate
Division, holding that the policy beneficiary might properly stipulate for
a gift over on her death, relied to some extent on the fact that the New
York legislature, in 1952 and while the case was pending on appeal, had
made it clear that a supplementary contract, even one containing a gift
over in the event of death, would require no protection from the statute
regulating the execution of testamentary dispositions,' ° so it might be said
6 In general, see Horton, "The Testamentary Nature of Settlements of Life Insur-
ance Elected by the Beneficiary," 18 Corn. L. Q. 72 (1931) ; Grahame, "Insurance
Settlement Agreements," 28 Iowa L. Rev. 55 (1942) ; Olson, "Testamentary Aspects
of Life Insurance Contracts," 275 Ins. L. J. 707 (1945) ; Grahame, "The Insurance
Trust as a Non-testamentary Disposition," 18 Minn. L. Rev. 391 (1934).
7 Specific statutory regulation usually exists with respect to joint bank deposits.
See, for example, Ill. Rev. Stat. 1953, Vol. 1, Ch. 76, § 2 et seq.
8 As to the validity of an arrangement whereby the depositor declares himself to
be trustee for another and the latter seeks payment of the account after the death
of the depositor, see Thompson, Cons. Laws N. Y., Banking Law, § 134(2).
9 The trial court said the action of the beneficiary was "not an acceptance ... of
the express terms of the option and for this reason also, the so-called supple-
mentary contract cannot be regarded as a supplementary contract of insurance,
since a supplemental contract of Insurance can result only from acceptance of the
express terms of a particular option." 109 N. Y. S. (2d) 646 at 651.
10 See the former New York Insurance Law, § 46(1) and § 145(2). See also New
York Personal Property Law, § 15(1), and McKinney, N. Y. Sess. Laws 1952, Ch.
820, adding Section 24-a to the Personal Property Law, which, among other things,
declares: "The enactment of this act shall not create any implication of invalidity
as to any contract or designation, of the nature herein described, made by any
person who dies before the effective date of this act." This language, together with
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that, as the result of the subsequent affirmance, the problem has been set-
tled, without question, in New York.
Nevertheless, since other states lack statutory provisions of the kind
relied on in the instant case, there is room for the production of contrary
holdings, particularly since the amount of case law on the point is so
miniscule that no established view could, as yet, be said to exist. In that
connection, it might first be noted that, as in the New York case of Gram
v. Mutual Life Insurance Company of New York, 1 no problem can arise
where one of the optional modes of settlement has been selected by the in-
sured or the policy beneficiary in conformity with the terms offered in the
original contract for then no attempt is being made to dispose of property
rights but merely to assert contractual rights, i.e., rights which came into
existence when the policy was originally issued.12 It follows therefrom
that if, as in the Gram case, the beneficiary should seek to vary the terms
of the initial arrangement, the company would not be obliged to concur in
the proposed variation for its duties were also fixed by the same instru-
ment and it could not be compelled to enter into a new contract against
its wishes.'3
When the company consents to a modification of the original contract,
as it did in the instant case, the conflict between contract rights and prop-
erty rights becomes sharpened by virtue of the existence of principles
relating to third party beneficiaries. Ever since the leading case of
Lawrence v. Fox14 was decided almost a century ago the principle has be-
come imbedded in American jurisprudence 5 that a third person for whose
benefit a contract has been made may maintain an action for its breach 8
and, in many states, this doctrine extends even to those who may be classed
as donee beneficiaries, as would generally be the case with respect to per-
sons, other than the insured, claiming under insurance contracts.
Recognition of the existence of contractual rights favoring such per-
sons, in other than insurance cases, has been accorded, even though the
the note of the Law Revision Commission, which sponsored the enactment, makes
it obvious that the fundamental purpose was to clear away uncertainty rather than
to produce a change in the law. See N. Y. Leg. Doc. (1952), No. 65(G).
11300 N. Y. 375, 91 N. E. (2d) 307 (1950).
12 Smith v. Smith, 172 F. (2d) 399 (1949) ; Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Bartlett, 53 F.
Supp. 1005 (1944); New England Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Harvey, 82 F. Supp. 702
(1949).
13 The court there said that, under a supplemental contract, "the rights and duties
of the parties flow from the original contract, whereas under a new contract they
flow from the new agreement." 300 N. Y. 375 at 384, 91 N. E. (2d) 307 at 312.
14 20 N. Y. 268 (1859).
15 See Williston, Contracts, Rev. Ed., Vol. 2, § 356: Restatement, Contracts. Vol. 1,
§ 135.
16 Brown v. Bowers Const. Co., 236 N. C. 462. 73 S. E. (2d) 147 (1952).
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donee beneficiary has not been precisely named in the contract, provided
he can show that the agreement was made with intent that he should be
benefited thereby," particularly so if he can show that the promise was
exacted by the promisee with the beneficiary in mind.'8 Such a bene-
ficiary has been held to possess vested rights against the promisor where
nothing remains for the promisor to do except to carry out his promise in
favor of the third party beneficiary, 19 although such would not be the case
where only incidental benefits are involved as it is essential that there be
a clear liability on the part of the promisor directly to the third person if
the latter is to succeed.
20
These principles have been utilized and have been applied in the only
insurance cases which, to date, have dealt with problems in any way
analogous to the one found in the instant case. In the case of Mutual
Benefit Life Insurance Company v. Ellis,21 for example, a federal court,
applying what it believed was the law of Colorado on the point, sustained
a subsequent agreement stemming from a life insurance situation wherein
the arrangement differed substantially from any of the policy options.
22
The Missouri Supreme Court, in the case of Kansas City Life Insurance
Company v. Rainey,23 reached a similar result on certain annuity con-
tracts under which the annuitant had reserved the right to change the
beneficiary at will and also enjoyed a privilege to surrender the contracts
for payment in his, the annuitant's, favor. The most recent decision prior
to the instant case, that achieved by the Supreme Court of Washington in
Toulouse v. New York Life Insurance Company,2 4 turned on the effect to be
given to an agreement entered into between the insured and the insurance
company, subsequent to the maturity of a twenty-year endowment policy,
17 Mercantile National Bank v. McCullough Tool Co., 250 S. W. (2d) 875 (Tex.
Civ. App., 1952). Compare the holding therein with the result attained in Shutes v.
Cheney, 123 Cal. App. (2d) 256, 266 P. (2d) 902 (1954).
s1 In re Conay's Estate, 121 N. Y. S. (2d) 481 (1953).
i9 Philey v. Phifer, 1 Ill. App. (2d) 398, 117 N. E. (2d) 678 (1954).
20 Kantes v. City of Chicago, 1 Ill. App. (2d) 420, 117 N. E. (2d) 790 (1954).
21125 F. (2d) 127, 138 A. L. R. 1478 (1942), cert. den. sub. nom. Elsenlord v.
Ellis, 316 U. S. 665, 62 S. Ct. 945, 86 L. Ed. 1741 (1942).
22 The policy permitted either of three optional modes of settlement, but the
beneficiary elected to leave the proceeds on deposit, evidenced by certain "Interest
Income" certificates, calling for the payment of interest in Colorado, which named
contingent payees in the event the original beneficiary did not apply for payment
during her lifetime. The court held that the policy beneficiary had not selected
either of the policy options and had, therefore, made a new arrangement with the
insurance company but that the arrangement was a valid one in favor of the
contingent donee beneficiaries.
23 353 Mo. 477, 182 S. W. (2d) 624, 155 A. L. R. 168 (1944).
2440 Wash. (2d) 538, 245 P. (2d) 205 (1952), noted in 31 CHICAGO-KENT LTAv
REvTIw 161. Donworth. J., wrote a dissenting opinion concurred in by Schwellen-
bach, Ch. J., and Weaver, J. Judge Mallery also wrote a dissenting opinion.
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calling for the payment of the proceeds to certain beneficiaries therein
irrevocably designated to receive the same but subject to the insured's
right to call for total or partial payment to himself in his lifetime. This
arrangement was also upheld as a valid third-party donee-beneficiary
provision.
The similarity between the situation presented in the last mentioned
case and the one involved in the case at hand is strong because, in both
instances, summary action by the principal party concerned could have
readily extinguished the interests of the donee beneficiaries, yet the ar-
rangements so made were upheld as being no more than valid contractual
provisions which the parties were competent to adopt if they so wished.
These holdings do, however, push third party beneficiary doctrines to ex-
treme limits. It is true that an agreement to pay money at a specified
time after the death of the promisor would be considered contractual and
not testamentary in nature25 and, if a contract is made upon a valid con-
sideration, it would be considered enforcible even though it provided, as
one of its terms, that title to property should pass to another upon the
death of one of the parties. 26 For that matter, a contract does not take on
a testamentary character merely because the time for performance is
postponed until the death of one of the parties, such delay being regarded
not as a testamentary disposition so much as a post-mortem performance. 27
But, in these instances, the legal rights of the beneficiaries are considered
as having arisen under the original contract, are usually vested in charac-
ter, and are measured by the terms of that contract. 28
In the light of these principles, it can be seen that no problem would
arise with respect to the ordinary insurance situation where the claim and
suit, if any, rests on the original contract and the beneficiary relies on
the precise terms thereof. Thus it has been held that the interest of a
designated beneficiary in a life policy is a vested property right, even
though the right to change the beneficiary has been reserved by the in-
sured, which can only be divested if there is a change of beneficiary ac-
complished as prescribed by the contract, 29 for which purpose an unexe-
cuted intention of the insured to change the beneficiary would be con-
sidered ineffective.80 It is also clear that, where no power of divestiture
25Kerrigan's Estate v. Joseph E. Seagram & Sons, 199 F. (2d) 694 (1952).
26 In re Ilg's Estate, 348 Ill. App. 545, 109 N. E. (2d) 362 (1952).
27 Eisenhardt v. Schmidt, 27 N. J. Super. 76, 98 A. (2d) 698 (1953).
28 Macartney v. Parmenter, 109 F. Supp. 493 (1952).
29 Prudential Life Ins. Co. of America v. Douglas, 110 F. Supp. 292 (1953).
30McPhall v. John Hancock Mutual Life Ins. Co., 108 F. Supp. 902 (1952). See
also Continental Assurance Co. v. Conroy, 111 F. Supp. 370 (1953), and Stone v.
Stephens, 92 Ohio App. 53, affirmed in 155 Ohio St. 595, 99 N. E. (2d) 766 (1951).
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has been reserved in a life policy, the issuance of such a policy confers
vested rights upon the person named therein as beneficiary which cannot
be transferred or destroyed without the consent of the beneficiary3 l for
the designation then initiates an inchoate gift of the policy proceeds8 2
which, upon the death of the insured, becomes fully vested and enforcible
by action.8 3
There would also seem to be little difficulty involved in applying these
principles to common forms of life insurance trusts under which the policy
proceeds are payable to a designated beneficiary, either revocably or ir-
revocably appointed, to hold in trust for purposes designated in the ac-
companying trust instrument. The recent Oregon case of Gordon v. Port-
land Trust Bank34 will serve to illustrate this fact. In that case, the in-
sured had caused the bank to be designated as the revocable beneficiary
under certain life insurance policies. The bank had collected the proceeds
of these policies on the death of the insured which it claimed the right to
hold and administer in accordance with the provisions of the trust agree-
ment. The plaintiff there contended that the trust agreement was in the
nature of a testamentary disposition which had been revoked by the act
of the testator-insured in making a later will but the court held to the
contrary. Although the case was one of first impression in Oregon, the
question has been litigated extensively elsewhere, has been the subject of
much discussion by textwriters and commentators,3 5 and has usually re-
sulted in a determination to uphold the arrangement on the basis that the
insurance trust will generate no more than trust problems which will have
no bearing on testamentary aspects of the situation. 36
It is, however, a little difficult to correlate the contract and trust
principles which have been noted herein to situations like the one involved
in the instant case when the terms of the original contract have, to a large
degree, been satisfied or discharged and the designated beneficiary, en-
titled to receive payment under the policy, has thereafter devised a dif-
31 Lowery v. Independent Life & Acc. Ins. Co., 209 Ga. 753, 76 S. E. (2d) 5 (1953).
32 Manufacturers' Life Ins. Co. v. Moore, 116 F. Supp. 171 (1953).
33 Waxman v. Citizens Nat. Trust & Say. Bank of Los Angeles, 123 Cal. App. (2d)
145, 266 P. (2d) 48 (1954).
34 - Ore. -, 271 P. (2d) 653 (1954).
35 Scott, Trusts, § 57.3; Bogert, Trusts and Trustees, §§ 238-9; Grahame, "The
Insurance Trust as a Non-testamentary Disposition," 18 Minn. L. Rev. 391 (1934) ;
Hanna, "Some Legal Aspects of Life Insurance Trusts," 78 U. of Pa. L. Rev. 346
(1930).
36 In Bose v. Meury, 112 N. J. Eq. 62, 163 A. 276 (1932), for example, it was held
that a gift in trust of the proceeds of a life insurance policy would be made complete
by the designation of the trustee as beneficiary in the policy. Possession of the
policy by the trustee was said not to be essential. See also Gurnett v. Mutual Life
Ins. Co., 356 Ill. 612, 191 N. E. 250 (1934), and Ill. Rev. Stat. 1953, Vol. 1, Ch. 73,
§ 853.
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ferent manner of treatment for what is clearly then the beneficiary 's
property. Insurance company executives appear to be conscious of the
confusion and potential danger which could follow from a holding that
these supplemental arrangements are of testamentary character 7 but it
is questionable whether the members of state legislatures are also alert
to these possibilities.8 8  While the decision in the instant case may serve
to lead other courts to similar holdings, there is good reason to believe that
legislation akin to the present New York statute should be adopted in
other American jurisdictions for existing principles do not clearly dictate
an obligation to achieve an identical result. If justification should be
needed for the development of statutory rules on the point which could
be said to call for different treatment in insurance cases from that which
would be given to other contract or property rights, this justification ought
to be found in the fact that, on insurance questions, the social consequence
of a particular determination would possess so widespread a public effect
as to bring the matter within the realm of public, as opposed to mere
private, interest.8 9
C. E. R. STRAND
LIBEL AND SLANDER-WORDS AND ACTS ACTIONABLE AND LIABILITY
THEREFORW-WHETHER AN ACTION MAY BE MAINTAINED AGAINST THE ES-
TATE OF A TESTATOR FOR LIBELOUS MATTER APPEARING IN A WILL PUB-
LISHED SUBSEQUENT TO TESTATOR'S DEATH-The Supreme Court of Ore-
gon, by means of the case of Kleinschmidt v. Matthieu,1 a case of first im-
pression for that jurisdiction, was recently confronted with the question
as to whether or not an action for libel would lie against the estate of a
testator whose will contained defamatory statements pertaining to one
of the beneficiaries named therein. The defamatory matter first became
public when the will was duly admitted to probate, whereupon the plain-
37 See, for example, the affidavit of the vice-president and chief actuary of the
company involved in the instant case offered in the trial court and reproduced in
part in 109 N. Y. S. (2d) 646 at 653.
88 Except for statutory regulation with respect to standard provisions which must
be included in life insurance policies, and as to provisions which are prohibited, the
only Illinois provision is one which permits the issuance of policies containing more
favorable terms than the standard ones. See Ill. Rev. Stat. 1953, Vol. 1, Ch. 73,
§§ 836-7 and § 844(2).
39 The idea that the Insurance structure of the nation is a matter of public
concern, transcending the importance of a decision to the particular litigants, has
been expressed in Palmer v. Central Life Assur. Soc. of U. S., 193 Minn. 306, 258
N. W. 732 (1935); George v. Guarantee Mut. Life Ins. Co., 144 Neb. 285, 13 N. W.
(2d) 176 (1944) ; Smith v. New York Life Co., 86 N. E. (2d) 340 (Ohio, 1948), not
reported officially: and Kuhnle v. Mutual Life Ins. Co. of New York, 20 Wash. (2d)
255, 147 P. (2d) 281 (1944).
1 - Ore. -, 266 P. (2d) 686 (1954).
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tiff, a grandson of the testator, considering himself defamed by the lan-
guage of the will,2 brought his action for damages against the testator's
estate. On demurrer to the complaint for failure to state a cause of ac-
tion, the trial court held for the defendant. On appeal to it, the Oregon
Supreme Court reversed this holding on the ground that an action would
lie against a testator's estate whenever libelous matter appeared in a will
even though no publication occurred until after the testator's death.3
The opinion in the case reveals a determined effort on the part of the
court to plug a loophole in the law through which an occasional testator,
protected by the safety of the grave, has been able to commit a tort
through the medium of a libelous will without being subject to legal re-
course. Fortunately, few such cases have arisen but in those cases the
major problem has been one centering around technical difficulties with
respect to establishing the necessary element of publication 4 and the con-
fusion produced by common law rules concerning the abatement of actions
as modified by various survival statutes enacted by the states.5 The task
of the court in the instant case was, therefore, one to find a satisfactory
legal basis upon which to predicate its decision without doing too much
violence to established doctrines or ignoring the views expressed by courts
in other jurisdictions.
In that connection, the leading case favoring a denial of liability is
the Georgia case of Citizens' & Southern National Bank v. Hendrickso
wherein the court reasoned that the tort was completed upon the writing
of the will but, the tort being a personal one, the common law rule of
abatement became operative immediately upon the death of the testator
so as to bar a suit. In advancing this theory, however, the Georgia court
appears to have overlooked the elementary rule that libel is actionable
only when there has been a publication of the defamatory matter to
2 The particular beneficiary was charged in the will with deserting his mother,
with taking sides against the testator in a lawsuit, and with having been a "slacker"
by reason of shirking his duty in World War II.
3 The court relied, in part, on Ore. Const. 1857, Art. I, § 10, which gives every man
a remedy for injury done to his reputation.
4 It is fundamental law that a libelous injury does not occur at the time of the
writing but rather upon the publication of the defamatory matter to others:
Restatement, Torts, Vol. 3, §§ 558 and 577. In Yousling v. Dare, 122 Iowa 539,
98 N. W. 371 (1904), the court decided that, as the testator was never subject to
any liability during his lifetime, since the libelous matter had not been published
prior to his death, the common law maxim could not apply because it referred to
the destruction of causes of action which had existed during lifetime.
5 Reference, of course, is made to the maxim actio personalis moritur cum persona,
i. e., personal actions die with the person. An interesting discussion of this maxim
may be found in Holdsworth, Hist. Eng. Law, Vol. 3, p. 576.
6 176 Ga. 692, 168 S. E. 313, 87 A. L. R. 230 (1933).
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others, 7 and it appears to have completely failed to give consideration to
the fact that a publication would ordinarily occur subsequent to the
testator's death and in connection with the probate proceedings. In con-
trast, in the earlier Tennessee case of Harris v. Nashville Trust Company,"
representative of the other view although involving the same type of facts,
it was reasoned that, as the death of the testator was the cause of the pub-
lication of the libel, it could not, at the same instant, be also operative to
produce an abatement of the action.9  To obviate and untangle the prob-
lems thus illustrated, appreciable efforts have since been made by other
courts to find suitable theories by means of which it would be possible to
preserve an action for testamentary libel.
Recognizing that a defamation arising from the indiscretion or
malevolence evidenced by a testator at the time of preparing his will should
be a wrong for which a remedy ought to be provided, two of the cases al-
lowing a recovery, although treating the point in an unsatisfactory man-
ner which has only compounded the confusion, have reached the conclusion
that the executor of the estate was to be deemed the agent of the deceased
testator for the purpose of making the necessary publication. ° Realizing
that this line of reasoning overlooks established principles of law with
respect to the agency relationship," the Oregon court concerned with the
instant case was careful to point out that an executor could not be an
agent of the testator after the latter's death, since any agency which
might have existed would be terminated by the death of the testator-
principal, it not being coupled with an interest. Furthermore, while an
executor derives his position from the nomination in the will, his authority
comes from his official appointment by the court, in which respect the
executor is considered more nearly to be an officer of the court, following
probate of the will, than an agent of the testator. 12
The argument has been advanced that a recovery for a testamentary
libel should be permitted by holding the executor himself personally
7 Prosser, Handbook of the Law of Torts (West Pub. Co., St. Paul, 1941), p. 810
et seq. The holding might apply, all other things being equal, in the event the
testator published the defamatory matter at the time of writing, as, for example,
by reading the provisions of the will to the attesting witnesses.
8128 Tenn. 573, 162 S. W. 584, 49 L. R. A. (N. S.) 897 (1914). It does not appear
that this case was brought to the attention of the Georgia court involved with the
Hendricks case.
9 A note in 97 U. of Pa. L. Rev. 289 criticizes the Harris case as being no more
than a mere indulgence in dialectics.
10 Harris v. Nashville Trust Co., 128 Tenn. 573, 162 S. W. 584 (1914); In re
Gallagher's Estate, 10 Pa. Dist. 733 (1900).
11 Farmers' Loan & Trust Co. v. Wilson, 139 N. Y. 284, 34 N. E. 784 (1893);
Restatement, Agency, § 120.
12 In re Workman's Estate, 151 Ore. 475, 49 P. (2d) 1136 (1935).
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liable on the theory that the repetition of the defamation is a publication
in itself, chargeable to the one who republishes.'3 This theory has re-
ceived little judicial support since it runs contrary to the tort rule that
one may not be liable for the doing of an act which he has a legal duty
to perform. 14  Inasmuch as it would be the first duty of the executor to
produce the will for probate, if it is in his custody, irrespective of whether
it be libelous or not, the presence of defamatory matter therein would not
excuse him from performing this duty nor affect the admissibility of the
will to probate.15
The extreme opposite of this position was taken by a Pennsylvania
court, in the case of Nagle v. Nagle,'6 where a recovery for defamation
resulting from a libelous will was denied on the ground the will was the
foundation of a judicial proceeding and was, therefore, absolutely priv-
ileged. 17 This view, which would save both the estate and the executor
from liability, also goes too far. In contrast thereto, the court in the in-
stant case, accepting an argument which had been made in the New York
case of Brown v. Mack,' s pointed out that a will is not made in the ju-
dicial proceeding but is, rather, the subject of it. For this reason, a claim
that a will is privileged would be no more valid than if the same privilege
was asserted with respect to a deed of land or to a contract which might
be offered in evidence.' 9
Equally undesirable would seem to be the method utilized in the New
York case entitled Matter of Draske20 where an executor, to protect the
estate against claims for injury from defamation, petitioned the court to
delete the defamatory matter from the will and this request was allowed
on the ground that only those directions which pertain to administration
and to the disposition of property constitute the essential elements of a
will.2 ' This view has not been shared by courts in other jurisdictions.
13 Prosser, op. cit., p. 813, and note in 27 Ill. L. Rev. 220.
14 Harper, "Privileged Defamation," 22 Va. L. Rev. 642 (1936), particularly pp.
651-4.
15 Matter of Reimers, 261 N. Y. 377, 185 N. E. 403 (1933) ; In re Jolly, 3 Wash.(2d) 615, 101 P. (2d) 995 (1940). But see Garr v. Selden, 4 N. Y. 91 (1850). By
statute, a person in possession of a will may be obliged to present the instrument
for probate, or at least file the same, under civil or criminal penalties if he does
not: Ill. Rev. Stat. 1953, Vol. 1, Ch. 3, §§ 212-3; Thompson Consol. Laws N. Y.,
Penal Law, § 2052; S. C. Code 1942, §§ 8946-7; Williams Tenn. Code Ann. 1942, § 10.
16 316 Pa. 507, 175 A. 407 (1934).
17 See Veeder, "Absolute Immunity in Defamation," 9 Col. L. Rev. 463 (1909).
18 185 Misc. 368, 56 N. Y. S. (2d) 910 (1945).
19 Moore v. Manufacturers' Nat. Bank of Troy, 123 N. Y. 420, 25 N. E. 1048 (1890).
20 160 Misc. 587, 290 N. Y. S. 581 (1936).
21 This view was said to follow the English practice as stated in Re Wartnaby,
1 Robb. Eccl. Rep. 423, 163 Eng. Rep. 1088 (1846), and in In re Goods of Honey-
wood, L. R. 2 P. D. 251 (1871). See also Brown v. Mack, 185 Misc. 368, 56 N. Y. S.
(2d) 910 (1945), and note in 32 Va. L. Rev. 189.
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They have refused to follow this theory because, without express statutory
authorization, a court would have no power to expunge any matter, de-
famatory or otherwise, appearing in a will.22 In addition, a court should
be hesitant to alter any part of a will not only because it would, in effect,
be undertaking to re-write the testator's will but also because the libelous
statements appearing in a will often manifest the motives of the testator in
setting up the scheme of distribution which has been adopted. 23
Accepting it to be the better view that the testator's estate, rather
than the executor, should suffer for the defamation which the testator has
been able to perpetrate through the medium of his will and that it would
be unfair to require the victim to go without a remedy, the problem still
remains as to whether or not such an action would be affected by the com-
mon law maxim calling for the abatement of personal actions upon the
death of the actor. As this maxim has normally been treated with ju-
dicial disfavor, a number of states have enacted survival statutes ex-
pressly abolishing the common law rule. 24  Seventeen states, however,
have measures which, while generally abolishing the doctrine, have ex-
pressly excepted from the survival statute those actions arising from
defamation, as to which the common law rule of abatement still operates. 25
Two states, by contrast, have codified the common law rule, except as to
designated actions there declared to survive, so that all other actions abate
at the death of either of the parties. 26  Still other states have expressly
provided for the survival of libel actions or other suits which sound in
defamation. 27
22 Woodrull v. Hundley, 127 Ala. 640, 29 So. 98 (1900) ; In re Pfarr's Estate, 144
Cal. 121, 27 P. 825 (1904) ; In re Meyers' Will, 72 Misc. 566, 131 N. Y. S. 27 (1911).
23 See Freifield, "Libel by Will," 19 A. B. A. J. 301 (1933).
24 S. C. Code 1942, § 419, for example, states: "All causes of action for and in
respect to . . . any and all injuries to the person shall survive both to and against
the personal representative of the deceased person." Statutes of this character have
been said to apply only to causes of action accruing before the death of the party:
United States Cas. Co. v. Rice, 18 S. W. (2d) 760 (Tex. Civ. App., 1929).
25 Ala. Code 1940, Tit. 7, § 150; Ark. Stat. 1947, Tit. 27, § 902; Colo. Stat. Ann.
1935, Ch. 176, § 33; Del. Rev. Code 1935, § 4637; Ill. Rev. Stat. 1953, Vol. 1, Ch. 3,
§ 494; Kan. Gen. Stat. 1935, § 60-3203; Ky. Rev. Stat. 1948, § 411.140; Md. Code
Ann., Art. 75, § 29; Minn. Rev. Stat., § 9656; Mo. Rev. Stat. 1939, §§ 98-9; Neb. Rev.
Stat. 1943, § 25-1401; N. C. Gen. Stat. 1943, § 28-175 (1) ; Okla. Stat. 1941, § 12-1052;
Ore. Stat. Ann. 1930, § 5-701; Purdon's Pa. Stat. Ann., Tit. 20, § 771; Williams Tenn.
Code Ann., § 8694; Wis. Stat. 1947, § 287.01 and § 331.01.
26 Wyo. Comp. Laws 1945, § 3-402; W. Va. Code 1943, § 5687.
27 Conn. Gen. Stat. 1930, § 6030; Fla. Stat. 1941, § 45.11; Ida. Code Ann. 1933,
§ 5-319; Ind. Stat. Ann. 1937, § 2-403; Iowa Code 1946, § 611.20; Me. Rev. Stat. 1944,
Ch. 152, § 8; Miss. Code Ann. 1942, § 609; N. H. Rev. Stat. 1942, Ch. 355:9 to Ch.
355:15; Thompson Consol. Laws N. Y., Decedent Estate Law, § 118; Throckmorton
Ohio Code Ann. 1940, § 11235. See also Estrick, "Survival of Causes of Action for
Libel, Slander, Malicious Prosecution, and Nuisance Under Ohio Law," 6 U. of
Cin. L. Rev. 404 (1932).
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Judicial interpretation of these survival statutes has produced some
startling results, as is evidenced by the South Carolina case of Carver v.
Morrow2 8 where, under analogous facts to those involved in the instant
case, the court said that an injury to reputation was not an injury to the
person, hence the survival statute did not apply. In much the same way,
the Washington case of Dyer v. Missouri State Life Insurance Company2 9
has operated to nullify the effect of the Washington statute"° for the
court there interpreted the statute to apply only in those cases where the
action survived at common law. As the statutes of two other states de-
clare that the rule of non-survival is not to apply where the injured party
still lives,3 1 it may be concluded that the several statutes, as interpreted
by the courts, if not practically irrelevant to the problem are so inadequate
as to be of little use in clearing a path through the legal maze involved
in the matter of granting relief to a party injured by a testamentary
libel.82
In holding that a cause of action arising from an injury produced by
the publication of a libelous will should prevail over the claims of lega-
tees, who are no more than privileged recipients of unearned wealth,3 8
the Oregon court has evolved a decision which results in no injustice or
inequity. Decisions of this character should operate to discourage tes-
tators from utilizing permanent public records as a vehicle for injuring
others, either maliciously or indiscreetly. The issues raised and deter-
mined in the case, however, suggest that there is manifest need for some
legislative re-examination of the problem so as to specifically enable a
libel action to survive the death of the testator.
J. L. WHITE, JR.
SCHOOLS AND SCHOOL DISTRICTS--PuBLIC SCHOOLS-WHETHER A PUB-
LIC SCHOOL DISTRICT, AS A QUASI-MUNICIPAL CORPORATION, IS IMMUNE
FROM SUIT ON TORT LIABILITY WHEN EXISTENCE OF LIABILITY INSURANCE
OR OTHER NON-EXEMPT FUNDS is NOT ALLEGED IN THE COMPLAINT-The
recent decision of the United States District Court for the Eastern Dis-
trict of Illinois in the case of Tracy v. Davis,' wherein plaintiff brought
an action against a trucking corporation and a public school district for
28 213 S. C. 199, 48 S. E. (2d) 814 (1948).
29 132 Wash. 378, 232 P. 346 (1925).
30 Remington Wash. Rev. Stat. 1932, § 967.
31 N. M. Stat. 1941, § 19-701; Tex. Rev. Civ. Stat. 1948, § 5525.
32 The Oregon court dealing with the instant case short-cut the whole problem by
refusing to acknowledge the existence of any common law rule binding upon it.
33 See note In 32 Corn. L. Q. 297 (1946).
1 123 F. Supp. 160 (1954).
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personal injuries sustained in an automobile accident, serves to illustrate
an important issue relating to pleading in suits against certain types of
corporations who might be considered immune from liability for the
torts of their agents. The complaint therein, while generally alleging
the elements of a cause of action, made no mention of the fact that the
public school district carried liability insurance or was possessed of other
non-exempt funds. The defendant school district moved to dismiss the
complaint as to it, as well as a cross-complaint which had been filed in
the action, 2 on the ground of its alleged immunity from tort liability. The
motion was denied when the District Court held that, despite the absence
of an allegation in the complaint that the school district had insurance or
other means by which to satisfy a judgment against it without impairing
public funds, the plaintiff would be entitled to bring an action and to
obtain a limited and conditional judgment against the school district,
although recovery thereunder might never be accomplished so long as the
assets of the school district were restricted to public funds.
Four years ago, following the decision of the Illinois Supreme Court
in the case of Moore v. Moyle,3 a forecast was made on the point as to
whether or not, in suits of the kind here under consideration, it would be
necessary for the plaintiff to allege in the complaint that non-public
funds, in a suit against a quasi-municipal corporation, or non-trust funds
in the case of a charitable institution, existed as a source from which
satisfaction could be obtained in order to state an actionable case.4 The
forecast, relying upon certain language used by the Illinois Supreme Court
in that case,5 was in the negative. The instant case now appears to have
confirmed that view although the court did say that, in reaching its de-
cision, the answer was not one entirely free from doubt.
2The defendant trucking company had filed a counterclaim against the plain-
tiff and a cross-claim against the school district, based upon the same trans-
action as that disclosed in the original complaint.
3405 Ill. 555, 92 N. E. (2d) 81 (1950), noted in 28 CHIcAGO-KENT LAW REVIEW
268, 38 Ill. B. J. 581, reversing 335 Ill. App. 342. 82 N. E. (2d) 61 (1948), noted
in 27 CHICAGo-KENT LAW REVIEW 3, 38 Ill. B. J. 187. Crampton, J., wrote a
dissenting opinion. Wilson, J., also dissented.
4DeFeo and Spencer, "After Moore v. Moyle; Then What?" 29 CHICAGO-KENT
LAW REVImw 107 (1951).
5 The court said: "It is apparent that . . . the question of insurance in no way
affects the liability of the institution, but would only go to the question of the
manner of collecting any judgment which might be obtained, without interfering
with, or subjecting the trust funds or trust held property to, the judgment. The
question as to whether or not the institution is insured in no way affects its
liability any more than whether a charitable institution holding private nontrust
property or funds would affect its liability. These questions would only be of
importance at the proper time when the question arose as to the collection of any
judgment out of nontrust property or assets." 405 I1. 555 at 564-5, 92 N. E. (2d)
81 at 86.
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A careful analysis of the leading cases on the subject elsewhere would
support the conclusion that, in those jurisdictions where the quasi-muni-
cipal or charitable corporation is not either absolutely liable or entirely
free from liability, a suit should not be dismissed for a failure on the part
of the plaintiff to allege and prove the existence of non-exempt funds or
property although the existence or non-existence thereof may materially
affect the enforcibilty of any judgment which might be secured. 6 Ac-
cepting for the moment that, under the present Illinois view, the limited
degree of immunity accorded to a school district is based upon a desire
to protect its public funds7 and, in the case of a charitable institution, the
protection of its trust funds,8 the point is far from settled as to whether
or not such defendants must possess non-exempt property at the time the
cause of action accrues or at the time the suit is brought although reference
to those cases cited with approval by the Illinois Supreme Court in the
opinion in the Moore case would indicate that it is not even essential that
non-exempt funds exist even at the time the judgment is entered. 9
Turning aside from the major issue for an instant, it would appear
to be pertinent to quote from the historical Indiana case of City of Con-
nersville v. The Connersville Hydraulic Company.10 The court there said
that while an ordinary action might be maintained against a municipal
corporation upon its contracts as well as its torts, and while it was true
that public property could not be seized upon execution, "this does not
affect the right to sue and obtain judgment. It is one thing to obtain a
judgment and another thing to enforce its collection . . . It would be a
strange doctrine that would impose upon a creditor, holding his debtor's
obligation, the duty of showing both a liability and an ability to pay."'
Not only is this proposition true as to ordinary suits but, in the only Illi-
nois case prior to the Moore holding in which a judgment against a charit-
6 St. Luke's Hospital Ass'n v. Long, 125 Colo. 25, 240 P. (2d) 917 (1952);
O'Connor v. Boulder Colorado Sanitarium Ass'n, 105 Colo. 259, 96 P. (2d) 835
(1939); Brown v. St. Luke's Hospital Ass'n, 85 Colo. 167, 274 P. 740 (1929);
St. Mary's Academy v. Solomon, 77 Colo. 463, 238 P. 22 (1925); Vanderbilt
University v. Henderson, 23 Tenn. App. 135, 127 S. W. (2d) 284 (1938); McLeod
v. St. Thomas Hospital, 170 Tenn. 423, 95 S. W. (2d) 917 (1936); Anderson v.
Armstrong, 180 Tenn. 56, 171 S. W. (2d) 401 (1943); Shivey v. St. Thomas
Hospital, 31 Tenn. App. 12, 211 S. W. (2d) 450 (1947).
7 Thomas v. Broadlands Community Consol. School Dist. No. 201, 348 Il. App.
567, 109 N. E. (2d) 636 (1953), noted in 31 CHICAGO-KENT LAW REvMW 279 and
1953 Ill. L. Forum 162.
8 Moore v. Moyle, 405 Il. 555, 92 N. E. (2d) 81 (1950).
9 Anderson v. Armstrong, 80 Tenn. 56, 171 S. W. (2d) 401 (1943): McLeod v.
St. Thomas Hospital, 170 Tenn. 423, 95 S. W. (2d) 917 (1936); Vanderbilt
University v. Henderson, 23 Tenn. App. 135, 127 S. W. (2d) 284 (1938).
10 86 Ind. 184 (1882). The case was not one in tort.
1186 Ind. 184 at 185-6.
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able corporation was upheld, that of Marabia v. Mary Thompson Hospital,1 2
stress was placed on the fact that a liability would exist unless the doctrine
of immunity was invoked as a defense in order to protect trust funds
against depletion.
Notwithstanding this fact, the Appellate Court for the Second Dis-
trict, in the case of Slenker v. Gordon,13 affirmed a judgment of a lower
court in favor of a defendant, in a tort action against a charitable corpo-
ration for personal injuries sustained as a result of a collision involving
an automobile driven by an agent of the corporate defendant, on the
ground the record established the fact that all of the then funds of the
corporation were trust funds and, being such, were entitled to protection.
Considering this application of the principles mentioned to be unfounded
in reason and logic, the judge writing the opinion in the instant case said:
"Of course the judgment cannot and should not be collected from the
trust funds or public funds, but if there are other assets such as insurance
which are available to pay the judgment this court can see no reason why
the judgment should not be obtained but be limited as to collection."14
It is true that, in the earlier Tennessee case of Gamble v. Vanderbilt
University,15 the recovery was predicated on the fact that funds were
then available which were not part of the trust assets, with the court
noting that it would not permit a judgment to be rendered in the event it
was made apparent that there was no property from which the judgment
could be collected. The Supreme Court of Tennessee did, however, again
consider the problem in the later case of McLeod v. St. Thomas Hospital,16
at which time it apparently repudiated this limitation for it there held
that the fact the defendant had no property subject to execution was no
defense to the tort suit, thereby adding emphasis to the point that it is
not the charitable institution which is entitled to immunity from suit so
much as it is the trust funds themselves which are to be protected.
It would appear to be on this basis, therefore, that the court concerned
with the instant case came to the conclusion that the plaintiff would be
entitled to maintain his action and to obtain a judgment, if proper, with-
out the necessity of alleging, or proving, the existence of non-exempt assets
in the hands of the defendant, although the judgment, if one was rendered,
would be limited in its enforcement to funds other than public funds. The
12 309 Il. 147, 140 N. E. 836 (1923).
13 344 Ill. App. 1, 100 N. E. (2d) 354 (1951), noted in 30 CHICAGO-KENT LAW
REVIEW 186.
14 123 F. Supp. 160 at 163.
15 138 Tenn. 616, 200 S. W. 510 (1918).
16170 Tenn. 423, 95 S. W. (2d) 917 (1936).
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holding would appear to be no more than a just and reasonably sound
projection of principles already laid down, the basic premise for which
rests in the fact that an individual who has been injured by the tortious
conduct of an agent or employee of a quasi-municipal corporation or of a
charitable institution should not be forced to suffer the loss where there is,
or may come to be, a source of satisfaction, other than public funds or
trust funds, from which a judgment could be paid.
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